Consumer Information and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities? by Fiona Scott Morton et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CONSUMER INFORMATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION: DOES THE INTERNET










We thank Ian Ayres, Judy Chevalier, Pinelopi Goldberg, Sharon Oster, Daniel Snow, and participants at the
2001 NBER IO Summer Institute for helpful comments. We also had many stimulating discussions with
David Levine. We gratefully acknowledge support from the Economics Program of the National Science
Foundation, Grant #: SES-0111885. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2001 by Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer and Jorge Silva-Risso.  All rights reserved.  Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Consumer Information and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet
Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?
Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer and Jorge Silva-Risso
NBER Working Paper No. 8668
December 2001
JEL No. J7, L1, O3
ABSTRACT
Mediating transactions through the Internet removes important cues that salespeople can use to
assess a consumer's willingness to pay. We analyze whether dealers' difficulty in identifying consumer
characteristics on the Internet and consumers' ease in finding information affects equilibrium prices in car
retailing. Using a large dataset of transaction prices for new automobiles, the first part of the paper an-
alyzes the relationship between car prices and demographics. We find that offline African-American and
Hispanic consumers pay approximately 2% more than other consumers, however, we can explain 65%
of this price premium with differences in income, education,a nd search costs; we find no evidence of
statistical race discrimination. The second part of the paper turns to the role of the Internet. Online
minority buyers who use the Internet Referral Service we study, Autobytel.com, pay nearly the same
prices as do whites, irrespective of their income, education, and search costs. Since members of minority
groups who use the Internet may not be representative, we control for selection. We conclude that the
Internet is disproportionately beneficial to those who have personal characteristics that put them at a
disadvantage in negotiating. African-American and Hispanic individuals, who are least likely to use the
Internet, are the ones who benefit the most from it.
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Before the Internet established itself as an important tool for communication, information
search, and purchasing, Peter Steiner foresaw that the emerging medium would create some
degree of anonymity for its participants (see his famous 1993 New Yorker cartoon above). In
this paper, we analyze whether the increased diﬃculty in accurately assessing a consumer’s
willingness to pay on the Internet and consumers’ ease in ﬁnding information aﬀects race and
gender discrimination in car retailing—a large industry in which prices are negotiated.
We show ﬁrst that disadvantaged minorities pay 2.0 - 2.3% more for their cars than do
white consumers. Most of this minority premium can be explained with diﬀerences in non-
racial demographics and search costs between minority groups and whites. Second, we show
that the Internet eliminates most of the oﬄine minority premium in car buying.
Corresponding to our two primary ﬁndings, the paper is divided into two parts. To test
whether the Internet’s obfuscation of consumer characteristics aﬀects equilibrium prices, we
must ﬁrst establish that oﬄine negotiations result in diﬀering car prices depending on individual
consumer characteristics. In the ﬁrst half of the paper, we analyze the relationship between car
prices and demographics. We are particularly interested in whether characteristics exhibited
by consumers of diﬀerent races and genders can explain variation in new car prices. Since the
two major papers in this literature come to diﬀerent conclusions, we analyze this question in
detail before investigating the eﬀects of the Internet. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) run a careful
audit with “testers” of diﬀerent races and genders who are trained to bargain identically. They
ﬁnd that Chicago area car dealers oﬀer black male testers and black female testers prices that
are signiﬁcantly higher, by $1100 and $410 respectively, than those oﬀered to white men.1
1In addition, Ayres (2002) ﬁnds $400 and $500 African-American premia in a smaller study of transaction
2In contrast, Goldberg (1996), using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, ﬁnds no
statistical diﬀerence in the mean price paid by white and minority consumers, and thus no
evidence of discrimination. In fact, she ﬁnds that none of her demographic controls, not just
the race and gender indicators, play a role in explaining new car prices.
The existing literature thus leaves unresolved the question of whether women and racial
minorities pay higher prices on average than do white males, or that any individual consumer
characteristics aﬀect car prices. We can answer these questions because we have data that
are unusually well-suited to this purpose: approximately 700,000 individual car purchases by
consumers who live in neighborhoods with varying demographics.
Without controlling for any other demographic characteristics, we ﬁnd that black and His-
panic buyers pay on average about 2.1% more (almost $500 for the average car) than do white
buyers for identical cars. Since the average diﬀerence between price and invoice on a vehicle in
our sample is $1700, this represents an almost 30% higher markup. After including neighbor-
hood averages for education, income, wealth, and occupation, the minority premium declines
to 1.5% for blacks and 1.1% for Hispanics. Including proxies for search costs diminishes the
premium further, to 0.8% for blacks and 0.6% for Hispanics. Thus, about 65% of the minority
price premium can be attributed to observable individual diﬀerences in income, education, and
search costs. We ﬁnd a small price premium for women, 0.43% ($100).
The second part of the paper turns to the role of the Internet. We test for the eﬀect
of the Internet on price discrimination with data on whether consumers used the Internet
referral service Autobytel.com in purchasing their car. We have found in previous research that
Autobytel.com users pay lower than average prices for new cars (Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton,
and Silva-Risso 2001). Autobytel.com allows consumers to request a price quote from an
aﬃliated dealer without engaging in face-to-face interaction. Consequently, dealers are exposed
to fewer cues that signal a consumer’s willingness to pay. They can (imperfectly) identify,
however, African-American and Hispanic consumers by their names, addresses, and telephone
interactions. In addition, Autobytel.com reduces search costs and provides consumers with
information. In line with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the minority premium declines to an
insigniﬁcant level for buyers who use Autobytel.com.
Combined, these results shed some light on the nature of race discrimination in car buying.
Academics and policy makers have been concerned with whether price discrimination in car
buying has a “disparate impact” on minorities and whites or are evidence of a “disparate
treatment” of minorities and whites. “Disparate impact” refers to the rational response by
dealers to diﬀerences among individual consumers—if racial minorities pay diﬀerent prices than
prices at one dealer.
3do white males, it is because they have diﬀerent education, income, search costs, and perhaps
bargaining ability. Alternatively, dealers may be treating customers diﬀerently (“disparate
treatment”) because they make statistical inferences based on group averages. This is a form
of “racial proﬁling.”
The combination of our results suggests that the race premium results from disparate im-
pact, not disparate treatment. We come to this conclusion because the Internet referral service
we study, Autobytel.com, passes on the names and addresses of potential customers to its con-
tract dealers and most customer contact is over the phone. Hence, while the Internet removes
important cues that salespeople can use to determine a consumer’s willingness to pay (clothing,
body language, etc.), a dealer can relatively easily infer the racial or ethnic background of an
Internet consumer. This means that the Internet eliminates the oﬄine race premium despite
the fact that the dealer is likely to know the minority status of Internet consumers. This
suggests that dealers are not conditioning car prices on race, i.e. that there is no disparate
treatment between minorities and whites. Note that this inference assumes that salespeople
who sell to Internet consumers behave similarly to other salespeople.
We conclude, ﬁrst, that pricing of new cars strongly depends on individual characteristics of
car buyers, in particular non-racial demographics and search costs. This has not previously been
established, to our knowledge. Secondly, our large dataset allows us to estimate a relatively
precise race premium; in particular, we establish that disadvantaged minorities pay 2.0 - 2.3%
more for their cars than do white consumers. Finally, we conclude that the Internet eliminates
most variation in new car prices that is due to race and ethnicity. The combination of our results
and the information available to Autobytel.com dealers suggests that a car market in which
prices are negotiated (as opposed to posted and ﬁxed) has a disproportionately negative impact
on minority buyers, but that the negative impact is probably not due to diﬀerent treatment of
diﬀerent races by dealers. Our results have important policy implications. If use of the Internet
is likely to reduce the adverse eﬀects of poor education and income, then the so-called “Digital
Divide” is of even greater importance and concern. The very people who beneﬁt most from
using the Internet are those who systematically are less likely to have access to it.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the likely eﬀect of Auto-
bytel.com on diﬀerential pricing. Section 3 is a description of the data. Section 4 contains the
ﬁrst set of results, establishing that oﬄine car prices depend on individual consumer charac-
teristics. Section 5 contains the second set of results, showing that the Internet reduces most
of the diﬀerence in pricing between racial groups. Section 6 concludes the paper.
42 Autobytel.com’s eﬀect on diﬀerential pricing
Autobytel.com is an independent Internet referral service that oﬀers consumers detailed in-
formation about individual cars, including current market conditions and invoice pricing. At
any point a consumer may submit a free purchase request that is forwarded to one of Autoby-
tel.com’s contracting dealers. The consumer provides her name, address, contact information,
and the type of car she is looking for. A salesperson at the dealership contacts the consumer
within 48 hours (often much sooner) with a price. While Autobytel.com strongly encourages
its contract dealers to set a ﬁxed price, dealers are free to deviate from the initial price oﬀer in
response to consumer negotiation.2 Communication may occur by email or telephone. In this
way a consumer may purchase a car without setting foot in the dealership until she picks up
the vehicle. Autobytel.com assigns dealers an exclusive territory; any leads generated within
that territory are passed on to the dealer in exchange for a dealer subscription fee. As of the
year 2000, Autobytel.com contracted with approximately 5,000 of the 22,000 US dealerships.
Car prices are individually negotiated, so there is opportunity for signiﬁcant price dis-
crimination in the market. The same car sells for diﬀerent prices because consumers diﬀer in
characteristics. The economics literature has focused mainly on patience, search costs, and
information as the characteristics that aﬀect negotiated prices (Admati and Perry 1987, Salop
and Stiglitz 1977). The Internet is likely to change such price discrimination, ﬁrst, because
consumers can obtain more information, second, because services such as Autobytel.com train
dealership salespeople to treat consumers in a uniform manner, and third, because many of the
personal characteristics of consumers are no longer observable. However, one can also argue
that the Internet might make price discrimination easier since a dealer knows a consumers’
name and address prior to oﬀering a price. We discuss these arguments in sequence.
Autobytel.com and other online services allow consumers to determine features and speci-
ﬁcations of new cars and also to read reviews. This may narrow down a consumer’s search to
fewer vehicles, thereby reducing her search costs. In addition, a consumer can learn the invoice
price of the vehicle she is interested in. While this is not a perfect measure of the dealer’s
marginal cost, it is a good measure, and can help the buyer determine dealer surplus.
The manner in which Autobytel.com trains salespeople at contracting dealerships may also
contribute to diﬀerent bargaining outcomes. The “Internet salesperson” is supposed to handle
only Internet referrals and not “walk-ins.” Also, he is supposed to be compensated on sales vol-
ume rather than margin. According to J.D. Power and Associates (2000a) some dealers follow
2According to J.D. Power and Associates (2000a), 42% of dealerships claim that their initial price contains
no room for further negotiation. 42% give discounts but leave room for negotiation. 14% will quote a discounted
price only if the customer insists by e-mail or phone. 2% of dealerships don’t give discounted price until the
consumer comes to the dealership.
5these behavioral recommendations, while many do not. If followed, these compensation prac-
tices would decrease the Autobytel.com salesperson’s incentive to look for buyer characteristics
that indicate a weak bargaining position.
Also, the Internet removes important cues that salespeople can use to determine a con-
sumer’s willingness to pay. A salesperson cannot take into account the buyer’s clothing, body
language, vehicle, or accent as signals of her reservation value or bargaining ability. The last
two - vehicle and accent - may be revealed to the salesperson during the course of the nego-
tiation if it takes place over the phone and includes discussion of a trade-in. However, the
dealer clearly has less information about the buyer than he would have if the buyer were in the
dealer’s showroom.
The preceding arguments suggest that dealers should be less likely to price discriminate
for online than oﬄine consumers. Thus, Autobytel.com might help certain types of consumers
more than it does others. Consumers who lack information or have characteristics that indicate
they are poor at bargaining should beneﬁt the most from Autobytel.com because they beneﬁt
more than do other consumers from information, fewer cues about their type, and uniform
pricing policies.
However, one can also argue that the Internet actually facilitates price discrimination. This
is because a purchase request contains name and address and could thus be used to infer gender,
ethnicity, and neighborhood. At a minimum the dealer could look up the average demographics
of the consumers’ zip code; at a maximum the dealer could purchase individual-level data of
the type normally used by direct marketers, and condition on likely ethnicity and gender. Note
however, that this could be done by “oﬄine” dealers also, provided they have a few minutes
away from the customer.
3 Data
Our principal data come from a major supplier of marketing research information (henceforth
MRI). MRI collects transaction data from a random sample of dealers in the major metropoli-
tan areas in the United States. We have data containing every new car transaction at those
dealerships from January 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000. This includes customer information,
the make, model and trim level of the car, ﬁnancing, trade-in information, dealer-added extras,
and the proﬁtability of the car and the customer to the dealership. We add to these data
census demographic information, measures of dealer competition, and information on whether
a consumer submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com. After dropping observations
with missing data, our dataset contains 671,468 transactions at 3,562 dealerships. Summary
statistics are in the Appendix.
63.1 Dependent variable
We deﬁne Price as the price the customer pays for the vehicle, factory installed accessories
and options, and dealer-installed accessories contracted for at the time of sale that contribute
to the resale value of the car. We subtract the ManufacturerRebate, if any, given directly to
the consumer. We also subtract what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. This is the
diﬀerence between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the estimated
wholesale value of the trade-in vehicle (as booked by the dealer). This number may be positive
or negative depending on whether the dealer is over- or under-paying for the trade-in. We
adjust the price of the new car for this amount to account for the possibility, for example, that
a dealer may oﬀer a consumer a high price for the new car so he can artiﬁcially subsidize the
trade-in. (This pattern is the most common in our data.)
3.2 Measures of race and gender
Our data on race and gender are of two types, census block group level data and individual level
data. A “block group” makes up about one fourth of the area and population of a census tract.
On average, block groups have about 1100 people in them, and we will refer to them hereafter
as census blocks. MRI matches census data from the buyer’s address to the transaction record.
The census variables that pertain to race are PctHispanic, PctBlack, and PctAsian, which
measure the percent of residents in a census block that indicate they belong to those groups.
On the individual level, MRI records Age directly. Gender and race are coded as what MRI
calls “target” variables. They are created by software programs that analyze the buyer’s ﬁrst
and last name. MRI compares the ﬁrst name to a list of common female ﬁrst names and creates
a “probably female” variable. This will be our Female variable, where one indicates a female
customer. The problem with this variable is that many cars are oﬃcially bought by two people
and the dataset only records the ﬁrst name on the registration. If the owners are “Mary and
John Doe,” our dataset records Mary as having purchased the car and the Female variable is
one. However, John may have been the one who actually bargained for the car. While we cannot
ﬁx this problem, we will later compare subsamples of the data to better measure the true impact
of gender. MRI also looks for common Chinese and Japanese last names. These we combine
into an indicator variable called Asian. The buyers that MRI classiﬁes as having Hispanic last
names get a value of one in our Hispanic indicator variable. Notice, however, that it is not
clear that the dealer’s perception of “Hispanic” is better captured by the name variable than
the census neighborhood variable. This is because of a potential diﬀerence between having
a Hispanic surname, coming from a Hispanic neighborhood, a persons’s self-perception as a
Hispanic, and the dealer’s perception that a consumer is Hispanic. MRI also identiﬁes some
7other races such as Native American and Paciﬁc Islander through common names, but the
numbers are so small that we do not use this information.
The median percent black, Hispanic, and Asian in buyers’ census blocks are 1.3%, 4.5%,
and 2.2% respectively. The sample includes buyers from blocks that are 100% Asian and 100%
black, but the Hispanic maximum is 55%. 12,150 of our buyers (1.7% of the sample) come from
census blocks with greater than 75% black residents. The MRI name analysis results in 8% of
our new car buyers being classiﬁed as likely Hispanic, 2% being classiﬁed as likely Asian, and
36% as likely female.
To establish the relationship between MRI race variables and census data, we examine block
groups where the percentage of Hispanics is greater than 50%. We tabulate the MRI indicator
variable Hispanic for that sample. We ﬁnd that 62% of these consumers are considered Hispanic
by MRI. This suggests the MRI procedure does very well at identifying Hispanic consumers.
We repeat the test for Asian and ﬁnd that that MRI considers only 22% of consumers to have
Asian names in census blocks where over 50% of residents identify themselves as Asian. This
may be because Asian last names are harder to categorize or because they buy fewer cars. We
double check the reliability of the indicators by repeating this procedure on blocks with zero
PctHispanic and PctAsian. The results for the second trial yield 2% Hispanic names and .5%
Asian names, a reasonable level considering that residents select their racial groups and that
marriage may create some ambiguity. We will use the MRI indicator variables in the remainder
of the paper, recognizing that the Asian indicator may be somewhat less reliable than the
Hispanic indicator.
The major racial group not identiﬁed on the basis of last names is African-American. How-
ever, we know the percentage of any given census block that is black. We use the relationship
between PctHispanic and Hispanic and PctAsian and Asian to infer the eﬀect of being a black
customer in addition to living in a minority census block.
3.3 Data on usage of Internet Referral Services
To test for the eﬀect of Internet usage we use purchase requests submitted by consumers on
Autobytel.com during 1999. Autobytel.com forwarded slightly over over 2 million referrals to
dealers. We consider a match between observations from Autobytel.com and MRI when the
geocoded address or phone associated with the referral and the purchase transaction are the
same. Each observation in the new dataset is a transaction from the MRI data, augmented
with the information from the Autobytel.com data if there was a match. We have (1) an
indicator for Autobytel.com customer (Autobytel) indicating that the customer who purchased
the car submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com (irrespective of whether this purchase
8request went to the dealer that sold the car), and (2) an indicator for Autobytel.com franchise
dealer (AutobytelFranchise) indicating that the dealer who sold the car is an Autobytel.com
aﬃliated dealer, i.e. is under contract with Autobytel.com and receives purchase requests.
We restrict ourselves to observations in which an Autobytel.com user purchased a make
and model for which she requested a referral. This is to ensure that Autobytel.com consumers
received an initial price quote for the purchased automobile without having had to have stepped
into the dealership. This eliminates about 3% of observations.
Autobytel.com was the leading Internet Referral Service in 1999.3 However, since there are
online referral services other than Autobytel.com, the customers in the combined dataset who
are not identiﬁed as using Autobytel.com may have used one of its competitors. This biases
our test against our hypotheses since we will be comparing a group that used Autobytel.com
to a group that may include users of competing services.
3.4 Controls
We use car ﬁxed eﬀects to control very precisely for the cost of the car. A “car” in our sample
is the interaction of make, model, body type, transmission, displacement, number of doors,
number of cylinders, and trim level. We control for 834 “cars” after dropping “cars” with fewer
than 300 sales. We do not have information on options that are outside of trim levels, which is
why we include the percent deviation of an observation’s invoice price (its VehicleCost) from
the average VehicleCost of that type of car in the dataset.4 We call this variable DVehCost.
For example, if the car has a sunroof and we don’t observe it, the car’s invoice price will be
higher than average. Our DVehCost variable will be positive in this case because the focal car
is more expensive. In the regression this variable will have a positive coeﬃcient close to one
because it is measuring the part of cost we cannot control for with our ﬁxed eﬀects.
To control for time variation in prices we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if the
car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. Dealers who want to meet volume targets
for the month often have sales or other inducements to purchase near the end of the month. A
dummy variable WeekEnd speciﬁes whether the car was purchased on a Saturday or Sunday for
the same reason. In addition, we introduce dummies for each month in the 14 month sample
period to control for other seasonal eﬀects and inﬂation.
3Autobytel.com had between 45 and 50% market share of online car shopping in 1999 (LA Times, 3/28/2000,
“Mergers and Acquisitions Report,” Securities Data Publishing 6/12/2000). According to J.D. Power and As-
sociates (2000b), Autobytel.com is the most visited purchase referral site. It is visited by 33% of consumers that
researched online to shop for a car, followed by Autoweb.com (18%), and Carpoint.com (17%).
4The VehicleCost is the retailer’s ‘net’ cost for the vehicle and includes the cost of accessories added by
the factory and/or retailer and included in the customer’s contract that add to the vehicle’s book value. The
measure takes into account holdback and includes transportation charges.
9To control for how “hot” a car is and the dealer’s opportunity cost of not selling it, we
control for the number of months between when a car was sold and its introduction. Judging
by the distribution of sales after car introductions we assign a dummy variable to sales in the
ﬁrst four months, months 5-13, and month 14 and later.
We also control for the competitiveness of each dealers’s market. For each dealership we
count the number of dealerships of the same nameplate that fall in a zip code that is within
a 10 mile radius of the zip code of the focal dealership. We control for cases where one owner
owns several franchises. Hence, our Competition measure counts only the number of separately-
controlled entities. Finally, we control for the 17 regions in which the car was sold.5
4 Prices vary with demographics
We begin our analysis by estimating the eﬀect of various demographic measures, including race,
gender, and age. We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
ln(Pricei)=γDi + βXi +  i
The D matrix contains demographic information about the purchaser in transaction i as
described above. The X matrix is composed of transaction and car variables: car, month, and
region ﬁxed eﬀects, controls for time variation, competition, car cost, and whether a consumer
traded in a vehicle.
4.1 Results
Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes census demographic information but no MRI race variables.
We expect income and education to be positively correlated but to have the opposite eﬀect on
transaction prices. High income indicates a lower elasticity of demand and a higher opportunity
cost of time, while high educational levels may make a person a more eﬀective negotiator.
Hence, we have few priors on the signs of our census block variables. We ﬁnd that most are
signiﬁcant (see column 1 of Table 2): higher income lowers car prices until the average block
income reaches $80,000, at which point increases in income increase price. Coming from a block
with a higher percentage of people who have gone to college and higher house values lowers
prices. Home ownership, a proxy for creditworthiness, also lowers prices. The probability of
being a blue-collar worker or an executive are insigniﬁcant. Coming from a block with a higher
5For a more detailed description of many of the variables in the data, see our earlier paper Scott Morton,
Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001).
10percentage of people who are professionals increases car prices. So does a higher probability of
not ﬁnishing high school.
We ﬁnd that women pay more for cars (.2%), as do older consumers (.2% for moving from 20
to 64 years old) and consumers who have a higher probability of being either black or Hispanic.
A buyer with probability one of being black pays 1.5% more for the equivalent vehicle than
does a buyer that has probability zero of being black (an increase of 100% percent black in a
census block group). An increase from zero to one in the probability of being Hispanic raises
the expected price of a new car by 1.1%. People from census blocks with Asians pay less for
new cars; an increase from zero to one in the probability of being Asian lowers the price of a
car by about .4%. All age, gender, and race coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Our second speciﬁcation includes the MRI race variables and is reported in column 2 of
Table 2. The coeﬃcients of Asian and Hispanic are statistically signiﬁcant and have the same
sign as in the census speciﬁcation. Including these variables reduces the size of the census block
coeﬃcients in each case. The coeﬃcient on Hispanic is .5% while the coeﬃcient of PctHispanic
falls to .7%. This results in almost the same total eﬀect as in the previous speciﬁcation. Adding
an indicator variable for Asian raises the total eﬀect of being Asian; this racial group pays 1%
less than others on average, in contrast to -.4% on the basis of the census data alone. These
results suggest that—were it to exist—an indicator for African-American would be statistically
and economically signiﬁcant and reduce the coeﬃcient on PctBlack, but that it would not
change the overall impact of race on price. It also suggests that the census block information
picks up some, but not all of the race indicator eﬀect.
In interpreting the coeﬃcients, there are two marginal eﬀects of interest. One is the diﬀer-
ence between probability zero and probability one of being a particular race. The other is the
price premium for a targeted minority in an average census block. This is obviously a much
smaller number, since, for example, the average census block has 1% black residents. The next
two speciﬁcations show that the zero to 100% interpretation is more appropriate. We restrict
the sample to buyers from two types of census blocks: those with less than two percent black
residents, and those with more than 75% black residents. The leaves about 386,000 out of the
original 650,000 transactions in the sample. We then generate a new indicator Black that is
one if the customer is from a census block where more than 75% of people are black. The
coeﬃcient on this variable is 1.4% (see column 3 of Table 2). Notice that this coeﬃcient is
extremely close to 100 times the PctBlack coeﬃcient, or 1.5%.
To see if this procedure replicates the MRI indicator variable, we repeat it for Asians and
compare the coeﬃcient on our indicator variable to the -.97% in column 2. We deﬁne the new
Asian indicator variable using bounds of 0.5% and 75%. The coeﬃcient on our constructed
variable is -1.2% (not reported). This is quite close to the sum of the coeﬃcients on the MRI
11Asian indicator and the PctAsian*100, which total -1.1%. However, it is larger than the eﬀect
we would estimate by taking 100 times the PctAsian coeﬃcient of -.006. These experiments
lend support for the interpretation of the percentage coeﬃcients as representing the eﬀect of a
buyer changing from being minority with zero probability to 100% probability.6
We are concerned with the interpretation of the Female coeﬃcient because in cases of
joint car ownership by a couple the variable may not accurately measure whether a woman
has bargained over the price of the car. To estimate the eﬀect of joint ownerships on the
Female coeﬃcient we compare the female premium for cars that are predominantly purchased
by couples (“Minivans”) with the premium for cars that are likely to be purchased by women
alone (“Compact Entry” and “Compact Sporty”). Our conjecture is that a male is more likely
to have participated in the purchase of a “Minivan” than a “Compact Entry” or “Compact
Sporty” car that is listed in our data as a female purchase. Comparing the Female coeﬃcient
in the two columns of Table 3, we see the expected result: while gender plays no role in the
price of minivans, women pay 0.43% more for small cars, or $98 for the average car. The likely
smaller measurement error in the small car segments leads us to prefer this estimate of the
gender premium to the sample-wide one. The estimate of 0.43% is still likely to be conservative
since women are frequently advised to bring a man along to negotiations with car dealers.
Our estimate of a minority premium between $350 and $500 is much smaller than those of
Ayres and Siegelman (1995), whose testers ﬁnd unexplained minority premia of $410 (female)
and $1100 (male). They are closer to, but still smaller than, the Ayres (2002) transaction
results. We investigate whether our data show the same relationship between minority female
and minority male prices. Column 4 of Table 2 shows that the interaction of PctBlack with
Female is positive, insigniﬁcant, and additionally, only 0.13%, or about $30 on the average
car. The coeﬃcient on PctBlack remains fairly steady at 1.3%. Hispanic women appear to pay
-.15% less than Hispanic men.7 The estimates of the female interaction coeﬃcients continue to
be close to zero and insigniﬁcant if we use only the sample of small cars (unreported).
We are concerned that our results might be driven by a small group of consumers from
poor neighborhoods, so we investigate whether our result holds when we restrict the sample to
buyers who live in “good neighborhoods.” We repeat our speciﬁcation restricting the sample
to buyers from census blocks with above average educational or income levels. The results are
reported in the last two columns of Table 2.
Neither the black, Hispanic, nor gender coeﬃcients change when the sample is restricted
6We do not create a new Hispanic indicator because the maximum PctHispanic is only 55% and thus too low
to create an equivalent variable.
7Note that we cannot test separately for “redlining” since our race data are neighborhood data and we are
thus already measuring price diﬀerences based on where people live.
12to buyers from census blocks with average incomes above the mean of $57,000. We ﬁnd very
similar results when we restrict the sample to buyers that reside in blocks where 32% or more
of residents have a college education: only the PctHispanic coeﬃcient declines. These results
indicate that our basic ﬁnding is not driven by one end of the income or education distribution.
We also run run 10% and 90% quantile regression to see if the variance in minority prices
is greater than that of white prices, as found in Goldberg (1996) (see Table 4). We ﬁnd that
a buyer who has a probability one of being black versus a buyer who has a zero probability of
being black pays only .7% more in the 10 percent regression but 2.5% more in the 90% quantile
regression. For Hispanics we combine the eﬀect captured in the census and the MRI variable
and ﬁnd that members of this group pay .26% more in the 10% regression but 1.9% more in the
90% quantile regression. For Asians we also combine the eﬀect captured in the census and the
MRI variable and ﬁnd that they pay 1.6% less in the 10% regression and the same as whites in
the 90% quantile regression. These results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Goldberg (1996)
that the variance in minority prices is greater than that of white prices. However, in contrast
to her, we ﬁnd that blacks and Hispanics pay on average more than do whites, even at the
low end of the price distribution. Our results on gender are not consistent with the ﬁndings
of Goldberg (1996). Females pay .21% more in the 10% regression and .28% more in the 90%
quantile regression. This indicates that the variance of female’s reservation price distributions
is not smaller than that for males.
Unlike Goldberg (1996), we ﬁnd that demographics explain variation in average transaction
prices. Our results are directionally consistent with Ayres and Siegelman (1995) but somewhat
smaller. We ﬁnd that black buyers pay about 1.5% more than white buyers, while Hispanic
buyers pay a 1.1% premium. Hispanic women pay a little less than the Hispanic average. We
also estimate that women pay about .5% more than do males (vs. 1.7% in Ayres and Siegelman
(1995)). Finally, we conﬁrm Goldberg (1996)’s ﬁnding that the transaction price variance is
larger for minorities than for whites, consistent with a higher reservation price variance for
minorities.
4.2 Explanations
We have focused on whether dealers are rationally responding to diﬀerences among individual
consumers. Alternatively, they may be treating customers diﬀerently because they make sta-
tistical inferences based on group averages. The ﬁrst is an artifact of the bargaining process—if
women and racial minorities pay diﬀerent prices than do white males, it is because they have
diﬀerent education, income and perhaps bargaining ability, not because dealers are discriminat-
ing on the basis of race and gender (“disparate impact”). However, if dealers treat customers
13diﬀerently because they make statistical inferences based on group averages, this is a form of
“racial proﬁling.”8 Ayres and Siegelman (1995) attribute the causes of their results to such
statistical discrimination. Our data does not allow us to distinguish between discriminatory
behavior by the dealer and diﬀerent behavior by customer groups because, unlike Ayres and
Siegelman (1995) we do not see the dealer’s oﬀer.9 However, we can observe the eﬀect of race
on price as we vary the speciﬁcation and, in this way, indirectly test for some explanations for
the race premium.
As a baseline regression, we estimate coeﬃcients for African-American and Hispanic buyers
that are not conditional on any demographic data except race and gender. We expect the
minority premia to increase since minority status is correlated with the demographics that
predict higher prices (less education, less home ownership). We ﬁnd that without controlling
for these buyer characteristics, black and Hispanic buyers pay 2.0% ($460) and 2.3% ($530)
more for their vehicles, respectively (see column 1 in Table 5). This contrasts with 1.5% and
1.1%, respectively, when income, education, occupation, and wealth are controlled for.10 If these
straightforward diﬀerences between consumer type explain 25% to 50% of the price premium
paid by minorities, could there be other diﬀerences between members of minority groups and
whites that can explain the remaining price premium? The following section explores this
question.
Minorities may not be able to ﬁnalize the transaction: Dealers may be less willing to engage
in a lengthy bargaining process with minority buyers if they are afraid that such shoppers will
not be able to purchase the car due to poor credit. If so, dealers eﬀectively “bargain harder”
with minority buyers since they expect no gains from trade. The sale may in many cases be
lost by the dealer. However, since we only observe transactions, not oﬀers, those minorities
that purchase a car should pay higher prices under this conjecture. To exclude consumers
that may be aﬀected by this argument, we restrict our sample to buyers who did not obtain
ﬁnancing from their dealer.11 Since dealers typically ask consumers early in the sales process
whether they require ﬁnancing, minority consumers that do not should not cause the dealer
to exert low eﬀort due to perceived credit risk. While many buyers that turn down dealer
8“Disparate treatment.”
9Thus at no point in the paper will we be able to conclude that we have found disparate treatment.
10These results illustrate that evidence of statistical discrimination can be very hard to observe. As Hylton
and Rougeau (1996) write “If race is a relatively good proxy for the information the statistical discriminator does
not collect, then the more information an empirical researcher collects in order to test for racial discrimination,
the less evidence there will be of discrimination” (p.252).
11We do not use information on ﬁnancing elsewhere in the paper for two reasons. First, it is a large topic
that deserves thorough treatment in a separate paper. Secondly, preliminary correlations suggest that ﬁnancing
proﬁts are not cross-subsidizing car prices. Rather the two tend to move together. Thus we feel it is reasonable
to omit an analysis of the price of ﬁnancing from this paper.
14ﬁnancing undoubtedly take out a loan elsewhere, some pay cash. In either case, such buyers
should have greater than average ﬁnancial savvy. The estimated race and gender coeﬃcients
are only slightly smaller in this restricted sample (compare column 2 in Table 2 with column 5
in Table 5). We thus ﬁnd no evidence that minorities pay a higher price because dealers may
be less willing to engage them in a bargaining process due to credit risk.
Minorities may buy at dealers with higher cost: Minorities might pay more than other groups if
the dealerships from which they buy have higher cost. This may be because they are located in
locations with higher costs of inputs and real estate. We examine this hypothesis by running a
price speciﬁcation with a franchise ﬁxed eﬀect. For reasons of computation we have to restrict
the number of car ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore lose about 36,000 observations. We ﬁnd nearly
identical race and gender coeﬃcients in this speciﬁcation (compare column 2 in Table 5 with
column 2 in Table 2). Hence, the minority premium is not due to purchases at higher cost
dealerships.12
Minorities may have an aversion to bargaining: If societal factors lead minorities and women
to be less eﬀective at bargaining or to dislike the bargaining process more, then they are
more likely to pay higher prices. Since bargaining is easiest for consumers when they can
take their business to a competitor, the payoﬀ from being a skilled bargainer should be lower
in a competitive market. Hence, if the premium paid by minorities is due to an aversion to
bargaining, this premium should be smaller in more competitive markets. To analyze this
conjecture we interact our minority and gender measures with our measure of competition. We
ﬁnd that the interaction between our minority race variables and market structure is positive
(see column 3 of Table 5), which is counter to theory. It seems we are picking up the high prices
paid by blacks and Hispanics in central urban neighborhoods where there are many dealerships
within 10 miles of a buyer.
The next speciﬁcation in the table checks this conjecture by including a population density
measure and its interaction with race. We ﬁnd that the main race coeﬃcients decline slightly,
but the interaction coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant: a minority consumer living in a
more urban area pays a higher price. Someone in a block with 15% black (Hispanic) residents
would pay an additional 1.1% (2.8%) if population density rose by one standard deviation.
In summary, we ﬁnd no evidence that minorities or women pay more because they have an
aversion to bargaining.
Minorities may face higher search costs: Given that minorities are less likely to own a car when
shopping for a new car, they are also more likely to face above average search costs (Mannering
12Because this procedure limits the sample, leaves us unable to study the eﬀects of market structure, and
strains available computing power, we do not use the speciﬁcation throughout the paper.
15and Winston 1991). Collecting basic information about features, prices, and availability for a
vehicle may be much more diﬃcult without a car. Higher prices would result because minorities
cannot comparison shop as easily. To examine whether higher search costs explain our estimated
race premia, we add an interaction between PctBlack or PctHispanic and an indicator variable
that is one if a customer traded in a vehicle at the dealer. Our speciﬁcation assumes the
majority of white consumers without a trade-in can nevertheless search, but that the presence
of a tradein measures which minority consumers can search (as consistent with the ﬁnding in
(Mannering and Winston 1991)). This allows us to analyze whether minorities that owned
a vehicle faced similar search costs as average members of the majority, and therefore paid
less of a race premium. The results in column 5 of Table 5 show that this is indeed the case.
Notice that we include an indicator variable for transactions with a trade-in in all speciﬁcations
in the paper. Consumers of all races who trade in a vehicle pay a small premium for that
convenience.13 Among consumers that did not trade in a vehicle, a buyer that has a probability
one of being African-American pays 1.9% more for the equivalent vehicle than a buyer who has
zero probability. The race premium declines to .8% for black and 0.6% for Hispanic consumers
who have traded in a vehicle.14 This suggests that higher search costs when buying a vehicle
may be responsible for a large part of the price premium paid by minorities. Our ﬁnding
provides interesting evidence about the bargaining strategies being used by dealers: searching
is required to get a good price. Those who cannot search pay a high price, those who can
pay a lower price. A system that requires price searching of this type could be said to have a
disparate impact if the minority consumers are disproportionately the ones who cannot search.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd that the minority premium of 2.0% or 2.3% (when no demographics
are in the regression) declines to .8% or .6% when we control for diﬀerences between groups of
consumers. In particular we ﬁnd that minorities seem to pay higher prices because on average
they face higher search costs.
5 The eﬀect of the Internet
The use of Autobytel.com varies with the racial composition of a census block. The mean use
of Autobytel.com in the data is 3.1%.15 At 2.8%, women are almost equally likely to use the
13The dealer can switch the plates, the owner does not have to clean, advertise, and recondition the car, etc.
14It is possible that buyers with a trade-in are richer or more highly educated, but we have included interactions
of these variables in unreported speciﬁcations and the marginal eﬀect is not as high as that of the trade-in. We
conclude that the trade-in itself must be important. We also try to roughly control for the value of the trade-in
by including its booked dollar value as a determinant of ln(price). If trade-in margins are proportional, a higher
value trade-in will result in a consumer paying a higher net price for her new vehicle. We ﬁnd this to be the
case, however, the race and trade-in coeﬃcients do not change (unreported).
15The overall Autobytel.com use is closer to 6% before we drop consumers who buy a diﬀerent car.
16service. Census group blocks with PctHispanic above 25% have a usage rate of 1.5% while the
same statistic for African-American and Asian blocks is 1.7% and 4.1%, respectively. Census
blocks where the sum of black and Hispanic residents exceeds 75% of the population have only
a 1% use of Autobytel.com.
5.1 Result
We begin with a speciﬁcation that includes an indicator variable Autobytel that is one if the
car buyer submitted a purchase request using Autobytel.com. We also include an indicator
variable AutobytelFranchise for Autobytel.com network dealers. The speciﬁcation is a follows:
ln(Pricei)=α1Autobyteli + α2AutobytelFranchisei + γDi + βXi +  i
Column 1 of Table 6 shows that Autobytel.com users pay about 1.2% less than do other
customers. The ﬁrst eﬀect is the main Autobytel.com discount of 0.9%. Users are also sent to
an Autobytel.com dealer for an additional .5% discount (which they would get by chance with
1/3 probability since Autobytel.com dealers sell 1/3 of all cars), resulting in additional savings
of .32%.
The inclusion of the Autobytel.com variables does not change our estimates of the price
diﬀerence paid by female and minority buyers. In the previous section we presented prelim-
inary evidence that people with high search costs pay more for cars. Since Autobytel.com
also lowers search costs, we investigate if women and minorities gain disproportionately from
using Autobytel.com. Since we have established that these groups pay above average prices,
they should beneﬁt more than do other consumers from information, obfuscation of consumer
characteristics, and uniform pricing policies.
We take the basic and minority indicator speciﬁcations from the previous section and in-
teract race and gender with the Autobytel.com indicator. Column 2 in Table 6 shows that
the coeﬃcient on PctBlack*Autobytel, is -1.2% and signiﬁcant. This substantially oﬀsets the
PctBlack coeﬃcient of +1.5%. The Autobytel coeﬃcient declines in magnitude because some of
the eﬀect is reﬂected in the interaction. The female interaction coeﬃcient is very small but also
negative. Women who use Autobytel.com pay a lower premium, by about $25, than do other
women. This speciﬁcation suggests that Autobytel.com helps African-Americans and women
recover a substantial part of the price premium they would otherwise pay. The Autobytel ∗
PctHispanic has a coeﬃcient of -2.0%, which more than makes up for the premium of 0.75% we
estimate for PctHispanic. The interaction coeﬃcient is large because the variable PctHispanic
is correlated with education, income, and home ownership variables that also have “Autoby-
tel.com” eﬀects. While these are included separately in the speciﬁcation, their Autobytel.com
17eﬀects seem to be partially picked up by the Autobytel∗PctHispanic measure. This can be seen
by repeating the interaction speciﬁcation with no demographics other than race and gender.
Column 3 shows that Hispanics who use Autobytel.com exactly eliminate the oﬄine Hispanic
premium.16
Finally, we estimate the interaction of Autobytel.com with minorities and women while
controlling for all demographics as well as franchise ﬁxed eﬀects (see column 4 in Table 6). We
see again that Autobytel.com use oﬀsets essentially all minority premia and half the gender
premium.
5.2 Endogeneity
Our ﬁndings suggest that minorities and women gain disproportionately from using Autoby-
tel.com. However, it is unlikely that these minorities and women are “average.” If they share
some unobserved characteristic that makes them use Autobytel.com but that also aﬀects price,
then our estimates do not reﬂect the causal eﬀect of the Internet referral service. First, we
discuss whether our results could be driven by the way that we measure whether a consumer
belongs to a minority group, and second, we econometrically control for a selection eﬀect (Heck-
man 1979).
5.2.1 Measurement of “minority”
A possible explanation of the preceeding results is that our OLS estimates are driven by middle
class minorities who live in white neighborhoods. These people are more likely to use Auto-
bytel.com and are also likely to pay low prices because of their high socio-economic status.
However, our measure of minority is not at the individual level; instead, we measure the pro-
portion of minorities in a census block group. Thus, for example, a few middle-class black
consumers who live in a heavily white census block will be classiﬁed as high probability white
in our data and cannot therefore be driving the minority results. In fact we have the reverse
problem; consumers we classify as “minority” may not be minorities. If white residents of a
heavily minority block have some unobservable individual characteristic that leads them to use
the Internet (for example, higher education), they will have a higher propensity to use Autoby-
tel.com and pay lower prices. We may thus be wrongly interpreting the eﬀect of “being white”
in a minority neighborhood as “using Autobytel.com” in a minority neighborhood.
16Buyers who are “disadvantaged” according to other metrics also pay lower prices when using Autobytel.com.
We interact %CollegeGraduates, %<Highschool, and MedianHHIncome with Autobytel. As expected, %College-
Graduates has a positive and High school dropouts and low income buyers have negative Autobytel interaction
coeﬃcients.
18To see whether high-education whites in minority neighborhoods could be driving our ﬁnd-
ing that minorities beneﬁt disproportionately from using Autobytel.com, we obtained data on
education by race at the census block (not block group) level from 1990. A census block con-
tains only about 100 people on average. We examine heavily minority blocks (in regions in our
main dataset), to see if white residents of those tracts have higher educational levels than do
their black neighbors and might thus be more likely to use Autobytel.com.
On the contrary, we ﬁnd that in tracts with a black population of greater than 50%, black
residents are more highly educated than are their white neighbors. For the median such tract,
the percentage of blacks with some college education (associate, bachelors, graduate) is 2%
greater than is the same statistic for whites. This diﬀerence increases to 5% in the median
tract with a white population of less than 25%. In addition, in the large majority of cases in
which no member of a group has any college education, that group consists of whites living
in heavily minority tracts. In both groups, the average percentage of residents with some
college or more is 25-30%. This suggests that the non-minorities in the block-groups we focus
on are not educationally advantaged relative to their neighbors and are not more likely to be
using Autobytel.com. This is consistent with demographers Denton and Massey who ﬁnd that
“middle-class blacks are forced to live in neighborhoods of much poorer quality than whites
with similar class backgrounds.”17
We can avoid the measurement problem altogether when we interact the indicator vari-
able Hispanic and Black with Autobytel.com. We ﬁnd that Autobytel.com eliminates 60% of
the race premium for blacks and all of the race premium for Hispanics (see Hispanic, Autoby-
tel*Hispanic in columns 2 through 4, and Black, Autobytel*Black in column 5, Table 6). We
conclude therefore that it is unlikely that we misidentify minority consumers.
5.2.2 Selection Eﬀect by Race
Notice that regardless of whether the coeﬃcient on Autobytel is driven by selection or causation,
for the interaction of Autobytel.com and race to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero due to
selection, there must be an additional selection eﬀect operating for speciﬁc races. A race-based
selection eﬀect might occur, for example, if disadvantaged minorities who manage to locate
and use Autobytel.com are even more aggressive about price than are the non-minorities who
choose to use Autobytel.com. We now turn to a formal IV model to handle this potential
problem.
17Page 814 in Denton, Nancy and Douglas Massey (1988) “Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation,” Social Science Quarterly, 69 (4) December 1988 pp.797-817
195.2.3 Instrumental variables model
Consider the following set of equations where B is an individual speciﬁc characteristic that is
unobserved and forms part of the error term.
Autobyteli = γZi + αBi + µi = γZi +  1i (1)
ln(Pricei)=φAutobyteli + βXi + δBi + νi = φAutobyteli + βXi +  2i (2)
Suppose that B is a desire and ability to bargain. This desire leads the buyer to use Autoby-
tel.com to strengthen her bargaining position, leading to positive alpha and a negative δ. Since
B is unobserved, Autobytel will be correlated with equation 2’s error term. In this scenario
the estimated coeﬃcient on Autobytel will be negatively biased relative to the true coeﬃcient.
A female consumer, for example, who is very interested in collecting information will be more
likely both to use Autobytel.com and to bargain for a lower price from the dealer. Consequently
it would be incorrect to treat the lower price as having been caused by Autobytel.com.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity we develop a selection equation. We use the de-
mographic variables to predict use of Autobytel.com. We identify the system with instruments
that aﬀect the underlying cost or beneﬁt of using Autobytel.com but that are not correlated
with the unobserved characteristic or price. Our ﬁrst instrument comes from the CPS Internet
and Computer Use Supplement (2000). Since familiarity with the Internet increases the chance
of using Autobytel.com to shop for a car, we use the percentage of people that use the Internet
at work in a city, PctInternetWork. Use of the Internet at work is determined by the employer,
so it is plausibly exogenous. For example, secretaries may have easy access to the Internet and
their bargaining skill may be low as compared to a construction worker in the same city. Our
second instrument is family size, which may be correlated with personal computers in the home
and/or wanting to shop for a car outside of normal business hours. We measure FamilySize at
the census block group level.
Our third instrument varies at the zip code level. It is a count of all the Autobytel.com
referrals to that zip code that are not in our dataset (because they do not match a purchase
transaction) divided by the zip code’s population. We expect there to be some idiosyncratic
variation in who uses Autobytel.com and that it might spread by word of mouth to neighbors
within the zip code. We are concerned that use of Autobytel.com in a zip code is positively
related to low prices at the local Autobytel.com dealer. However, the correlation between usage
and Autobytel.com residuals from the price equation is zero. We also recognize that consumers
in the same zip code share many demographics that predict Autobytel.com use; we control
for these in the selection equation. Our remaining instruments are based on the number of
20observations in the data that belong to the same “car” as the focal observation. This measures
the popularity of a combination of attributes for which the consumer has been searching. We
include NumberOfCars, linearly, squared, and cubed in our selection equation. (We ﬁnd that
people are less likely to use Autobytel.com when they are seeking very rare or very common
bundles of attributes.) This instrument varies by consumer, rather than on a geographic basis.
The intuition behind the identiﬁcation strategy is that diﬀerent consumers will have diﬀerent
exogenous tendencies to use the Internet based on the car they are looking for, the mix of
industries in their city, word of mouth in their zip code, and the prevalence of kids in their
neighborhood. These measures of the costs and beneﬁts of using the Internet for a particular
consumer are assumed (and tested) to not be correlated with price. Two minority consumers
with the same demographics who live in the same city but diﬀer in the car they are searching for
or in their census block group will have diﬀerent predicted probabilities of using Autobytel.com.
This is then related to the transaction price to ﬁnd an eﬀect of the Internet.18
We estimate in a probit speciﬁcation the use of Autobytel.com on our instruments and all
demographics used in the price equation. The pseudo R2 of about .06 is quite low, partly be-
cause we do not know which consumers used Autobytel.com’s two largest competitors (Carpoint
and Autoweb), so our dependent variable is undercounted. We estimate an additional probit
predicting minority use of Autobytel.com with the same explanatory variables. We use the pre-
dicted values from the probits as additional instruments in a two stage least squares regression
of price, with Autobytel and race∗Autobytel as the endogenous variables. We also include the
variable of interest, such as Hispanic, times the predicted probability of using Autobytel.com
as an instrument.
We begin with interaction coeﬃcients on the indicator variables for the two disadvantaged
minority groups in our sample, Hispanics and blacks. The results are reported in Table 7
(the instruments used in each speciﬁcation are reported at the bottom of the table). The
coeﬃcient on Autobytel increases in magnitude in all the speciﬁcations. This direction of
movement is consistent with results we have obtained in prior work.19 The ﬁrst column contains
the indicator variable Hispanic interacted with Autobytel.com. The Autobytel.com coeﬃcient
is -1.2% (p=.15), while the coeﬃcient of the interaction term Autobytel∗Hispanic is -2.9%
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The interaction coeﬃcient is probably larger than the main
Hispanic eﬀect for the same reason we saw earlier, namely that Hispanic is correlated with
other demographics.
18We cannot estimate Internet use variation within a block group for people buying the same car. However,
our cars are so speciﬁc and we control for costs so carefully that we are not concerned that our estimate relies
on across-car variation.
19See Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2001)
21Next we estimate the interaction of Autobytel and Black in the restricted sample with more
than 75% or less than 2% blacks. The interaction coeﬃcient is -33%, which is unreasonably
large. The large standard error is due to the small number (98) of Autobytel.com users from
heavily black neighborhoods. With a restricted sample and weak instruments, we cannot get
reasonable coeﬃcient estimates for the black interaction.
When we run an instrumental variables procedure on an interaction between Autobytel.com
and a census block percentage such as PctBlack or PctHispanic, we ﬁnd coeﬃcients that are
also large and unstable, so we do not report these results. Our instruments do not do a good
job of pinning down results with demographic averages.
We also try approaching the problem by limiting the sample to consumers with a high value
of some characteristic and estimating a single Autobytel coeﬃcient, rather than an interaction,
for that subsample. We focus on two characteristics that aﬀect car pricing but have more
heterogeneity across census blocks: income and education. In columns 5 and 6 in Table 7, we
restrict the sample to the bottom half of the income and education distribution, respectively.
Our theory suggests that the Autobytel.com coeﬃcient should increase in magnitude relative
to the OLS estimates for two reasons; the IV controls for the unobserved reasons to use Auto-
bytel.com and the sample choice increases the observable reasons to use Autobytel.com. The
estimated coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant, although larger than we would expect, at
-5% and -7%. We use the estimated coeﬃcients on only the census block measures from the
OLS regression in column 1 of Table 6 to calculate a measure of the eﬀect of demographic
variables on car prices. We ﬁnd the total impact of demographics ranges from negative two
percent to positive one percent in our sample. We average the demographic eﬀect within the
top and bottom income quartiles and ﬁnd that it changes by one percent between the two
groups. If a demographic eﬀect of this magnitude is added to the estimated IV ABT coeﬃcient
of approximately negative two, it would be reasonable to ﬁnd ABT coeﬃcient estimates for
low income and low education samples of about negative three percent. This suggests that
the true values of the ABT coeﬃcients in the disadvantaged sample are probably contained in
the 95% conﬁdence intervals of our point estimates, but our instruments are not allowing for
precise estimation.
While our instruments introduce substantial variance, the estimated Autobytel.com eﬀect
for the disadvantaged group in question is consistently negative and larger than the OLS es-
timate, indicating that the “aggressive bargainers use Autobytel.com” story is not driving our
results. The instruments pass an exogeneity test described in Hausman (1983) in all speciﬁ-
cations. The test statistic is N ∗ R2 from a regression of the IV errors on all the exogenous
variables in the system. It is distributed χ2 with K-1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number
of instruments.
225.3 Supply Side Pricing
One might think that uniform pricing by Autobytel.com salespeople was driving our results,
since uniform pricing would, by deﬁnition, eliminate discrimination. However, we do not ﬁnd
uniform pricing for Autobytel.com sales.20 We do ﬁnd less dispersion for Autobytel.com sales,
which is likely contributing to less variation in prices by race.
We calculate the standard deviation of the dollar margin and the percentage margin for each
dealer-model-quarter that has greater than 5 sales per period in each channel. We compare the
standard deviation between “street” and Internet channels for the same dealer-model-quarter
and ﬁnd that the this diﬀerence has a negative mean; Internet sales have less dispersion.
We examine the largest selling model-dealer combinations who have both Autobytel.com and
“street” sales, and plot the errors for each separately in Figure 2. Keep in mind that options
on the cars vary as does the time of year, which may be creating some base level of dispersion.
The ﬁrst franchise shows approximately similar dispersion between the two channels, while the
other three show noticeably less dispersion for Autobytel.com sales. The standard deviation
of dollar margin for the 30 largest model-dealer-quarter combinations has less variation for
Autobytel.com sales in 22 out of 30 cases. This is also true for 9 out of the largest 10 model-
dealer combinations.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that pricing of new cars to oﬄine consumers strongly depends on individual car
buyers’ characteristics, particularly income, education, and search costs. Using data on more
than 700,000 new car purchases in 1999, we ﬁnd a minority race premium of 2.0% to 2.3%
when we do not control for any demographics, 1.1% to 1.5% when we control for neighborhood
characteristics, and .6% to .8% when we (imperfectly) control for search costs. Our results are
diﬀerent from those in the previous literature, which ﬁnds either no role or conﬂicting results
on the eﬀect of demographics.
Our main ﬁnding is that the Internet eliminates most variation in new car prices that results
from individual characteristics associated with race and ethnicity; online buyers who use the
Internet Referral Service we study, Autobytel.com, pay the same prices as do whites, irrespective
of their income, education, and search costs. Our ﬁndings suggest that disadvantaged minorities
have more to gain from using an online buying service than do whites. If so, we would expect
minorities with access to the Internet to use it more intensively when shopping for a car. In
fact, a consumer survey conducted by J.D. Power and Associates (2000b) shows that minority
20We ﬁnd one dealer selling Dodge Durangos who appears to be selling at a uniform price.
23buyers who use an online buying service submit on average more purchase requests than do
white buyers (1.42 versus 1.35, diﬀerence signiﬁcant at 5% level).21
Our results suggest that dealerships condition prices on individual consumer characteristics,
but do so less for online than for oﬄine consumers. Internet consumers are better informed
and arrive through a channel that credibly signals their level of information. Furthermore,
dealerships have less information about a consumer when the interaction occurs through the
Internet. The Internet hides some of the information about a consumer’s willingness to pay
and so price discrimination is likely to be less pronounced. However, Autobytel.com’s price
quote delivery process allows the dealer to discover the consumer’s race in most cases. Yet
we ﬁnd that online minority consumers pay the same prices as do white consumers. This
suggests that Internet dealers are not taking race into account when setting prices.22 Instead,
our evidence points to the role of information and search costs as determinants of prices. In
addition, Autobytel.com’s dealer training and suggested volume-based compensation may have
contributed to less price discrimination.
We conclude that the Internet seems to beneﬁt disproportionately those who lack infor-
mation or who have personal characteristics that disadvantage them in negotiating. We ﬁnd
that any group that is less educated or less able to search pays higher oﬄine prices. Members
of these groups are also those who disproportionately beneﬁt from using the Internet. These
results suggest an additional aspect of the “Digital Divide”: not only are disadvantaged mi-
norities less likely to use a computer, but they are also the group that would most beneﬁt from
it.
21Of course, the unconditional use of online buying services by race will show that African-American and
Hispanic consumers are less intensive users. This is because they are less likely to have access to the Internet.
22Though we cannot rule out that racial discrimination is practiced by some dealers but not Autobytel.com
dealers. This would also be consistent with our results.
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Autobytel 671,468 0.03 0.17 0 1
AutobytelFranchise 671,468 0.24 0.43 0 1
Price 671,468 23,367 8,103 5957 100190
%Black 671,468 5.95 14.49 0 100
%Hispanic 671,468 8.25 10.27 0 55.33
%Asian 671,468 4.93 7.94 0 100
Hispanic 671,468 0.08 0.27 0 1
Asian 671,468 0.02 0.14 0 1
Female 671,468 0.36 0.48 0 1
CustomerAge 671,468 43.90 14.13 16 100
Age> 64 671,468 0.09 0.29 0 1
MedianHHIncome 671,468 56,597 24,905 10403 150000
%CollegeGrad 671,468 30.95 17.71 0 100
%<HighSchool 671,468 12.47 10.54 0 100
%HouseOwn. 671,468 72.99 22.38 0.14 100
%Professional 671,468 16.42 8.42 0 100
%Executives 671,468 17.39 8.06 0 100
%BlueCollar 671,468 26.27 14.99 0 100
%Technicians 671,468 2.99 1.97 0 100
MedianHouseValue 671,468 164,642 99,728 7500 500000
EndOfMonth 671,468 0.22 0.42 0 1
Weekend 671,468 0.23 0.42 0 1
DVehCost 671,468 0.0004 0.06 -0.64 0.73
AnyTrade 671,468 0.40 0.49 0 1
Competition 671,468 2.98 2.28 0 23
ModelMonth5-13 671,468 0.73 0.44 0 1
ModelMonth14+ 671,468 0.11 0.32 0 1
FamilySize 671,468 2.99 0.55 1.5 6
%InternetAtWork 615,899 0.15 0.05 0 0.41
#ofCarsSold 671,468 2,701 2,262 300 12063
%ReferralsInZip 625,722 1.22 8.13 0.004 1700
26Table 2: Regressions for results section†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable Full Full > 75% or > 75% or Full > $57,000 > 32%
ln(price) Sample Sample < 2% Black < 2% Black Sample Income College
%Black 0.01457 0.01469 0.01467 0.01478 0.01664
(0.00054)** (0.00054)** (0.00054)** (0.00130)** (0.00135)**
%Hispanic 0.01105 0.00671 0.00292 0.00291 0.00670 0.00770 0.00065
(0.00102)** (0.00104)** (0.00136)* (0.00136)* (0.00104)** (0.00202)** (0.00209)
%Asian -0.00390 -0.00096 -0.00031 -0.00031 -0.00096 0.00175 0.00162
(0.00096)** (0.00098) (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00098) (0.00131) (0.00127)
Hispanic 0.50539 0.53896 0.53936 0.55760 0.49703 0.51710
(0.02761)** (0.03767)** (0.03767)** (0.03339)** (0.04578)** (0.04813)**
Asian -0.96564 -0.85375 -0.85368 -0.96576 -0.83471 -0.77833
(0.04341)** (0.05799)** (0.05799)** (0.04341)** (0.05446)** (0.05388)**
%Black> 75 1.36567 1.29715
(0.06193)** (0.08689)**
Female 0.20610 0.20896 0.19364 0.18963 0.22107 0.18852 0.16345





Customer 0.00449 0.00474 0.00303 0.00303 0.00475 0.00291 0.00594
Age (0.00063)** (0.00063)** (0.00081)** (0.00081)** (0.00063)** (0.00089)** (0.00092)**
Age> 64 -0.16841 -0.16796 -0.14502 -0.14465 -0.16797 -0.08025 -0.14526
(0.02953)** (0.02952)** (0.03665)** (0.03665)** (0.02952)** (0.04194) (0.04326)**
MedianHH -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002
Income (1.39e-06)** (1.39e-06)** (1.71e-06)** (1.71e-06)** (1.39e-06)** (3.38e-06)** (2.18e-06)**
(Median 1.26e-10 1.25e-10 1.23e-10 1.23e-10 1.25e-10 1.21e-10 9.97e-11
HHInc.)
2 (7.58e-12)** (7.57e-12)** (9.11e-12)** (9.11e-12)** (7.57e-12)** (1.60e-11)** (1.08e-11)**
%College -0.00305 -0.00325 -0.00109 -0.00108 -0.00324 -0.00038 -0.00045
Grad (0.00095)** (0.00095)** (0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00095)** (0.00138) (0.00143)
%<High 0.00394 0.00310 0.00329 0.00329 0.00310 0.00950 -0.00309
School (0.00128)** (0.00128)* (0.00167)* (0.00167)* (0.00128)* (0.00297)** (0.00325)
%HouseOwn. -0.00274 -0.00271 -0.00241 -0.00240 -0.00271 -0.00427 -0.00276
(0.00045)** (0.00045)** (0.00062)** (0.00062)** (0.00045)** (0.00079)** (0.00070)**
%Professional 0.00459 0.00472 0.00157 0.00157 0.00471 0.00574 0.00475
(0.00139)** (0.00139)** (0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00139)** (0.00187)** (0.00180)**
%Executives -0.00013 0.00008 -0.00130 -0.00130 0.00007 0.00133 0.00120
(0.00147) (0.00146) (0.00179) (0.00179) (0.00146) (0.00200) (0.00198)
%BlueCollar 0.00018 0.00024 0.00082 0.00083 0.00023 0.00179 0.00178
(0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00102) (0.00187) (0.00199)
%Technicians 0.00460 0.00421 -0.00120 -0.00120 0.00420 -0.01053 -0.00711
(0.00347) (0.00347) (0.00440) (0.00440) (0.00347) (0.00500)* (0.00501)
MedianHouse -2.73e-06 -2.58e-06 -2.38e-06 -2.38e-06 -2.58e-06 -2.06e-06 -1.40e-06
Value (1.28e-07)** (1.28e-07)** (1.60e-07)** (1.60e-07)** (1.28e-07)** (1.72e-07)** (1.59e-07)**
EndOfMonth -0.34539 -0.34545 -0.35572 -0.35577 -0.34538 -0.32204 -0.33576
(0.01538)** (0.01537)** (0.01955)** (0.01955)** (0.01537)** (0.02104)** (0.02166)**
Weekend 0.11224 0.11079 0.10154 0.10160 0.11076 0.07238 0.04264
(0.01579)** (0.01577)** (0.02031)** (0.02031)** (0.01577)** (0.02181)** (0.02220)
DVeh- 88.18283 88.15525 88.11184 88.11188 88.15550 88.00853 87.40996
Cost (0.13374)** (0.13375)** (0.17123)** (0.17123)** (0.13375)** (0.19257)** (0.19463)**
Competition -0.02174 -0.02222 -0.02060 -0.02059 -0.02221 -0.03943 -0.03751
(0.00351)** (0.00351)** (0.00434)** (0.00434)** (0.00351)** (0.00472)** (0.00508)**
AnyTrade 0.30869 0.30861 0.33353 0.33353 0.30853 0.43029 0.48460
(0.01377)** (0.01377)** (0.01767)** (0.01767)** (0.01377)** (0.01973)** (0.02013)**
Constant 1,001.7 1,001.7 1,003.9 1,003.9 1,001.7 1,009.40189 1,009.20522
(0.13088)** (0.13081)** (0.17713)** (0.17713)** (0.13082)** (0.27175)** (0.23718)**
Observations 650850 650850 386155 386155 650850 285231 276632
R
2 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, month, region, and model recency ﬁxed eﬀects
Cell sizes in column 2: Asian 13030, Hispanic 53847; column 3: %Black>75 11205; column 4: Female*%Black>75 6134;
column 5: Female*Hispanic: 18491. 27Table 3: Female coeﬃcients by segment†
(1) (2)
Dep. Variable Segments: Compact Segment:





















































∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, month, region, and model recency
ﬁxed eﬀects
28Table 4: Quantile regressions†
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable .1 Quantile .9 Quantile Median
ln(price)
%Black 0.007 0.025 0.012
(0.001)** (0.001)** (4.57e-04)**
%Hispanic 1.53e-04 0.010 0.009
(0.002) (0.002)** (0.001)**
Hispanic 0.259 0.861 0.441
(0.043)** (0.054)** (0.024)**
%Asian -0.010 0.014 -0.002
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)**
Asian -0.591 -0.01432 -0.867
(0.071)** (0.093)** (0.046)**
Female 0.215 0.277 0.144
(0.023)** (0.029)** (0.013)**
CustomerAge 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Age> 64 -0.184 -0.129 -0.177
(0.049)** (0.061)* (0.028)**
MedianHHIncome -1.53e-05 -2.04e-05 -1.45e-05
(2.29e-06)** (2.91e-06)** (1.34e-06)**
(MedianHHInc.)
2 1.24e-10 1.39e-10 1.09e-10
(1.26e-11)** (1.62e-11)** (7.75e-12)**
%CollegeGrad -0.001 -0.008 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)** (0.001)
%<HighSchool 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.002)* (0.003) (0.001)*
%HouseOwn. -0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(0.001)* (0.001)** (4.18e-04)**
%Professional 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)* (0.001)**
%Executives 4.04e-04 -0.001 1.39e-04
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
%BlueCollar 9.19e-05 -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)**
%Technicians -0.008 0.016 -0.001
(0.006) (0.007)* (0.003)
AnyTrade -0.007 0.586 0.313
(0.023) (0.028)** (0.013)**
Competition -0.086 0.063 -0.034
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.003)**
Constant 995.8 1007.8 1001.3
(0.224)** (0.282)** (0.127)**
Observations 650850 650850 650850
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Standard errors in parentheses
† Unreported are EndOfMonth, WeekEnd, DVehCost, car, month,
region, and model recency ﬁxed eﬀects
29Table 5: Regressions for explanations section†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Full Sample Franchise Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample No
ln(price) Fixed Eﬀects Financing
%Black 0.01966 0.01301 0.01312 0.01302 0.01861 0.012
(0.00051)** (0.00054)** (0.00089)** (0.00070)** (0.00065)** (0.001)**
%Hispanic 0.02332 0.0102 0.00060 0.00770 0.01356 0.007
(0.00081)** (0.00106)** (0.00136) (0.00118)** (0.00113)** (0.002)**
%Asian -0.00963 0.00023 -0.00174 -0.00123 -0.00391 -0.002





Female 0.20619 0.19335 0.22654 0.20607 0.20536 0.287
(0.01388)** (0.01322)** (0.02233)** (0.01391)** (0.01391)** (0.025)**
CustomerAge 0.00444 0.00446 0.00448 0.00446 0.002
(0.0006)** (0.00063)** (0.00063)** (0.00063)** (0.001)*
Age> 64 -0.1342 -0.16903 -0.16803 -0.17039 0.294
(0.02822)** (0.02954)** (0.02953)** (0.02954)** (0.044)**
Competition -0.03703 -0.04851 -0.02974 -0.02170 -0.017
(0.00342)** (0.00522)** (0.00357)** (0.00351)** (0.007)*
—— ∗ %Black 0.00042
(0.00020)*
—— ∗ %Hispanic 0.00316
(0.00029)**
—— ∗ %Asian -0.00067
(0.00038)




—— ∗ %Black 0.00023
(0.00011)*
—— ∗ %Hispanic 0.00059
(0.00019)**
—— ∗ %Asian -0.00089
(0.00017)**
AnyTrade 0.33640 0.248 0.30688 0.30933 0.43094 0.811
(0.01373)** (0.013)** (0.01377)** (0.01377)** (0.01807)** (0.024)**
—— ∗ %Black -0.01061
(0.00103)**
—— ∗ %Hispanic -0.00719
(0.00143)**
Constant 1,000.99 986.4 1,001.7 1,001.6 1,001.6 1006.8
(0.10778)** (1.83e+9) (0.13132)** (0.13122)** (0.13082)** (0.253)**
Observations 650850 615349 650850 650850 650850 159819
R
2 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† Unreported are EndOfMonth, WeekEnd, DVehCost, car, month, region, and model recency ﬁxed eﬀects.
In addition, columns 2,3 and 4 include MedianHHIncome, (MedianHHInc.)
2, %Executives, %BlueCollar,
MedianHouseVal., %HouseOwn., %CollegeGrad, %<HighSchool, %Professional, and %Technicians.
30Table 6: Regression for Autobytel.com results†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Franchice > 75% or
ln(price) Fixed Eﬀects < 2% Minority
Autobytel -0.87654 -0.59146 -0.62544 -0.00614 -0.82428
(0.02826)** (0.04535)** (0.04530)** (0.04386)** (0.03649)**
AutobytelFranchise -0.45880 -0.45926 -0.48615 0.16628 -0.38789
(0.01511)** (0.01510)** (0.01510)** (0.06887)* (0.01938)**
%Black 0.01463 0.01481 0.01955 0.01317
(0.00053)** (0.00054)** (0.00051)** (0.00054)**
%Hispanic 0.00708 0.00746 0.01858 0.01055 0.00342
(0.00102)** (0.00102)** (0.00084)** (0.00105)** (0.00134)*
%Asian -0.00066 -0.00033 -0.00544 0.00003 -0.00010
(0.00095) (0.00097) (0.00094)** -(0.00097) (0.00134)
Hispanic 0.50563 0.51176 0.53103 0.49312 0.53824
(0.02722)** (0.02758)** (0.02752)** (0.02635)** (0.03715)**
Asian -0.95493 -0.96174 -0.97540 -0.76124 -0.84341
(0.04190)** (0.04330)** (0.04321)** (0.04164)** (0.05583)**
Female 0.20768 0.21127 0.21156 0.19429 0.19209
(0.01359)** (0.01388)** (0.01384)** (0.01320)** (0.01748)**
%Black> 75 1.36784
(0.06182)**
Autobytel ∗ %Black -0.01230 -0.01137 -0.01199
(0.00281)** (0.00281)** (0.00265)**
— ∗ %Hispanic -0.02026 -0.02052 -0.01200
(0.00383)** (0.00382)** (0.00373)**
— ∗ %Asian -0.00696 -0.00719 0.00075
(0.00326)* (0.00326)* -(0.00321)
— ∗ Hispanic -0.57086 -0.57085 -0.53253
(0.14903)** (0.14919)** (0.13843)**
— ∗ Asian 0.14260 0.14319 0.08893
(0.16351) (0.16369) -(0.15661)
— ∗ Female -0.12125 -0.12180 -0.09965
(0.05836)* (0.05836)* -(0.05537)
— ∗ %Black> 75 -0.86518
(0.41742)*
CustomerAge 0.00455 0.00453 0.00427 0.00278
(0.00062)** (0.00062)** (0.00059)** (0.00079)**
Age> 64 -0.16518 -0.16411 -0.12776 -0.14263
(0.02906)** (0.02906)** (0.02779)** (0.03609)**
AnyTrade 0.31169 0.31173 0.33687 0.25608 0.33617
(0.01350)** (0.01350)** (0.01346)** (0.01304)** (0.01731)**
Competition -0.03006 -0.03015 -0.04411 -0.02589
(0.00346)** (0.00346)** (0.00337)** (0.00427)**
Constant 1,001.9 1,001.9 1,001.3 1010.8 1,004.08348
(0.13868)** (0.13866)** (0.11706)** -(8.5E+12) (0.17538)**
Observations 671468 671468 671468 635050 398566
R
2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are EndOfMonth, WeekEnd, DVehCost, MedianHHIncome, (MedianHHInc.)
2, %Execu-
tives, %BlueCollar, MedianHouseVal., %HouseOwn., %CollegeGrad, %<HighSchool, %Professional,
%Technicians, car, month, region, and model recency ﬁxed eﬀects
Cell sizes: Column 2: Autobytel*Female 6800, Autobytel*Hispanic 780. Column 5: %Black>75
11,205, Autobytel*%Black>75 98.
31Table 7: Selection results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable .1 Quantile .9 Quantile IV IV, > 75% or IV, Income IV, % Less
ln(price) < 2% Black < $53,000 HighSch. > 10
Autobytel -0.235 -1.349 -1.18388 -2.46573 -7.42656 -5.14595
(0.080)** (0.100)** (0.93250) (1.21260)* (1.63748)** (1.65018)**
AutobytelFranchise -0.408 -0.491 -0.41889 -0.33685 -0.34815 -0.37384
(0.026)** (0.031)** (0.02651)** (0.03512)** (0.03723)** (0.03828)**
%Black 0.007 0.025 0.01461 0.01370 0.01305
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.00051)** (0.00062)** (0.00060)**
%Hispanic 0.001 0.011 0.00610 0.00323 0.00402 0.00251
-0.002 (0.002)** (0.00107)** (0.00134)* (0.00136)** (0.00134)
%Asian -0.01 0.014 0.00040 0.00086 -0.00130 0.00163
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.00099) (0.00142) (0.00164) (0.00144)
Hispanic 0.255 0.842 0.54132 0.50521 0.43245 0.45497
(0.044)** (0.053)** (0.03972)** (0.03807)** (0.03857)** (0.03770)**
Asian -0.624 -1.450 -0.97515 -0.86012 -1.15966 -1.17733
(0.070)** (0.090)** (0.04948)** (0.06657)** (0.08551)** (0.08029)**
Female 0.219 0.272 0.19977 0.17344 0.17948 0.18907
(0.023)** (0.028)** (0.01594)** (0.01997)** (0.02293)** (0.02261)**
%Black> 75 1.62439
(0.09797)**
Autobytel ∗ %Black -0.011 -0.022
(0.006)* (0.007)**
— ∗ %Hispanic -0.006 -0.038
-0.007 (0.009)**
— ∗ %Asian 0.012 -0.03
(0.006)* (0.007)**
— ∗ Hispanic -2.89706
(1.81231)
— ∗ %Black> 75 -33.32440
(10.09526)**
CustomerAge 0.004 0.006 0.00437 0.00176 0.00337 0.00351
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.00074)** (0.00091) (0.00105)** (0.00103)**
Age> 64 -0.184 -0.133 -0.17571 -0.14833 -0.24489 -0.22152
(0.049)** (0.060)* (0.03159)** (0.03799)** (0.04503)** (0.04472)**
AnyTrade -0.011 0.596 0.31496 0.28495 0.14703 0.12040
-0.023 (0.028)** (0.01628)** (0.01994)** (0.02382)** (0.02380)**
Competition -0.097 0.056 -0.02738 -0.02750 -0.01294 -0.00521
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.00358)** (0.00430)** (0.00555)* (0.00511)
Constant 997.7 1006.8 1,001.5 1,004.0 995.3 996.2
(0.242)** (0.293)** (0.14884)** (0.16893)** (0.24738)** (0.19013)**
Observations 671468 671468 576076 361870 312118 300558
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%
Standard errors in parentheses
† Unreported are EndOfMonth, WeekEnd, DVehCost, MedianHHIncome, (MedianHHInc.)
2, %Executives,
%BlueCollar, MedianHouseVal., %HouseOwn., %CollegeGrad, %<HighSchool, %Professional, %Technicians, car,
month, region, and model recency ﬁxed eﬀects.
1 Instruments for column 3: references in the zip code, family size, number of cars linear, squared, and cubed,
percent with Internet access at work, predicted probability of using Autobytel.com, the prediction times the
black indicator, and predicted probability of Black∗Autobytel. Column 4: references in the zip code, family
size, number of cars linear and squared, predicted probability of using Autobytel.com, the prediction times the
Hispanic indicator. Column 5: references in the zip code, number of cars linear, squared, and cubed, predicted
probability of using Autobytel.com, predicted probability of using Autobytel.com if income<53K. Column 6:
predicted probability of using Autobytel.com, predicted probability of using Autobytel.com if lesshs>10.












































































































































Dodge Durango, Franchise 198 Honda Accord, Franchise 2757
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